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Theorizations of the political in general, and international politics in particular, have been 
little concerned with the vast variety of other, non-human populations of species and ‘things’. 
This anthropocentrism limits the possibilities for the discipline to contribute on core issues 
and prescribes a very limited scope for study. As a response to this narrow focus, this article 
calls for the development of a posthuman approach to the study of international politics. By 
posthuman, we mean an analysis that is based on complexity theory, rejects Newtonian social 
sciences and decentres the human as the object of study. We argue for a decentering of ‘the 
human’ in our scholarship as imperative to understanding the complexity of the world. 





The term ‘environment’, as many critics have pointed out, is inadequate in that it reproduces 
a dualist understanding which sets the ‘human’ apart from other species, natures and entities 
and is grounded in the assumption that humans are not animals, or are an animal of a very 
special kind indeed. We will argue that by incorporating ‘the environment’ into the study of 
international politics as an ‘issue’ raising questions for security or governance, the separation 
of the ‘human’ from other species, natures and entities remains fixed, and the discipline 
continues to be anthropocentric.1 In order to move beyond anthropocentric International 
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Relations, we draw on a range of bodies of theory: complex systems theory, ideas of 
posthumanism and the politics of complex ecologism.2  
Theorizations within International Relations have been little concerned with the vast 
variety of other, non-human populations of species and ‘things’. This has meant that 
scholarship has been narrowly focused and does not actually reflect the ways in which human 
social and political life is neither exclusively social, nor exclusively human but bound up 
with non-human beings and things. In this article therefore, we are particularly interested in 
exploring what happens to the study of politics if: 
we took the “stuff” of politics seriously, not as a shorthand phrase for political 
activity but to signal instead the constitutive nature of the material processes 
and entities in social and political life, the way that things of every imaginable 
kind…help constitute the common worlds that we share and the dense fabric 
of relations with others in and through which we live?3   
This article argues for a decentering of ‘the human’ in our scholarship. Whilst some view this 
as scholarship in and of a ‘new’ reality in a technological age,4 we concur with those who 
suggest that ‘our’ human condition was ever populated with, by and in, other worlds of 
beings and things.5 The imperative of posthumanism is not just to develop tools for 
developing a understanding of human embeddedness in non-human animate and inanimate 
systems. We further suggest that a critical posthumanism is required. Like Cary Wolfe, we 
would hope that posthumanist scholarship might contribute to ‘an increase in vigilance, 
responsibility and humility’ that might accompany living in a world that is not understood 
humanocentrically.6 
Certain accounts of posthumanism, which we prefer to distinguish from our 
perspective by labeling them ‘transhumanism’, strongly underplay the distinctive qualities 
apparent between human bodily existence and computer simulation, between organisms and 
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cybernetic mechanisms. By contrast we consider that we must be attentive to distinction and 
boundaries, in addition to the overlapping and intersected qualities of social/natural/technical 
systems. There are important physical boundaries that distinguish humans and non-human 
animals from machines, and indeed, that also distinguish non-human animals from other non-
human animals given the incredible variety in ‘this vast encampment’ of ‘the Animal.’7 We 
need to take analytic account of both differences and distinctions as well as the ways in 
which beings and things (including ourselves, of course) are co-constituted.  
In addition, the concept of the ‘posthuman’, as it is currently articulated, tends not to 
foreground forms of social power and domination. When we contend that theorizations 
should be critically posthuman in quality, we mean that they need to understand our human 
condition as embedded in and constituted with, relations and practices with other species. 
This does not mean that we underplay or neglect forms of intra-human exclusion and 
exploitation. Rather, we argue that the category ‘human’ is a social construct linked to 
formations of power that both set the ‘human’ apart from other species and also constitute 
discourses of forms of intra-human domination. Sets of historically situated discourses, 
religious or secular, reproduce the separation of man from matter – ‘the anthropological 
machine,’ as Giorgio Agamben describes it.8 The economical, social, and political formations 
of Western modernity have been constituted by and through constructions of social 
inequality, of class, race and gender, and these social categories of difference and domination 
have also been cross cut by prevailing ideas about ‘nature’ and the separation of the human 
from it. To this end we draw on ideas within a range of schools of political ecologism 
alongside re-workings of the idea of ‘system’ from complexity theory, to develop what we 
call ‘complex ecologism’ as a politics which contests both intra-human social injustice, 
alongside predominant forms of exploitative human relations with the non-human. This then 
is a thorough-going normative project which utilizes complexity theory to highlight the 
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interactions between the human and non-human as a basis for re-considering the orientation 
of the study of International Relations. 
Our argument is developed in the following four sections. First, we consider how re-
workings of the notion of system in complexity theory can help us better theorize 
international politics in terms of international systems. Our perspective is to envisage 
international systems as open, comprised of multiple actors and embedded in a range of 
social, human, non-human and inanimate systems. Second, we move to a consideration of 
posthumanism, situating ourselves amongst more critical articulations such as are found in 
work in animal studies and political ecologism. Third, we consider how a posthumanist 
understanding of the world necessitates the recasting of many of the concepts that underpin 
‘the political’, but note that many of the ideas currently on offer are insufficiently attentive to 
relations of power.  Finally, we elaborate on the ways such relational power might be 
conceived through an ontology of ‘complex ecologism’. The drawing together of complex 
systems, posthumanism and a critical politics of ecologism enables us to think about the 
politics of global life in terms of what we call ‘posthuman international relations’.9 
 
Differentiated Complexity and International Systems 
The most sophisticated account of international systems to date is found in the work of Barry 
Buzan and Richard Little, and we would largely agree with their prescription for International 
Relations as a ‘failed intellectual project,’ that the discipline needs to embrace systems 
theorizing and to adopt an ‘holistic historical framework.’10 However whilst we find much of 
value in their systems approach, our analysis of systems is somewhat different and leads us to 
ultimately different conclusions. Buzan and Little remain wedded to a Newtonian and 
human-centred account of the social world, whereas we advocate a post-Newtonian, 
complex, and non-human centred account.  
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Such an account is principally enabled by the adoption of a complexity framework 
which informs different elements of our model of posthuman international relations. 
However introducing complexity theory to an International Relations audience is complicated 
not only by the associated terminology but also, and perhaps more significantly, by the 
variety of ways in which complexity has been understood and theorized.11 In short there is no 
‘one’ complexity theory. Crucially, analyses in the social sciences inspired by complexity 
thinking have interpreted complexity in radically different ways with significant ontological 
and epistemological implications.12 A particular distinction can be drawn between those 
approaches that view complexity as a feature of models or metaphors (a majority view), and 
those that see complexity as ontologically real. While most authors argue that a complexity 
approach provides us with a means of interpreting the social world, they differ on what 
constitutes the relationship between theory and the social world. In short, is the complexity in 
the metaphor or model, or is there an underlying physics at work which impinges on the 
social world. Metaphoric approaches use ideas derived from the physical sciences and apply 
these to the social world ‘as if’ complexity was at work.13 Modelling approaches attempt to 
use computers to play out scenarios replicating complex phenomena.14 We consider that to 
regard complexity theory as a metaphor for understanding social phenomena is a weak 
position and one that reflects a human-centred approach, ignoring the embodied character of 
human systems and existence. Likewise modeling has understated the embedded character of 
human systems and represents, in Morin’s words, a ‘restricted complexity’ which  ‘still 
attaches complexity as a kind of wagon behind the truth locomotive, that which produces 
laws’ and ‘avoids the fundamental problem of complexity which is epistemological, 
cognitive, paradigmatic.’15 An alternative approach is to consider complexity in the social 
world as under-pinned by physics, with social systems overlapping and intersected by 
biological and physical systems. Some have advocated a consilient approach seeing physics 
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‘all the way down’.16 While we would see complexity as ontologically real – by which we 
mean a property of, and observable across, a range of inanimate, animate, human and non-
human systems – and hence more than a feature of metaphor and models. This said, we also 
acknowledge that, because of human cognitive capacities to represent, analyze and adapt, 
human social systems, while exhibiting complex characteristics, need specific forms of 
analysis. We advocate an approach to the study of complexity that we describe as 
‘differentiated complexity’.  
A core idea from complexity thinking is the complex adaptive system. Systems from 
a complexity perspective refer to the boundaries which can be drawn around actors or units 
which have sufficient interactions to generate patterns, or emergent features. Boundaries in a 
complex system are open and porous in the sense that interactions between systems can 
impact on the character of internal inter-relationships – in other words complex systems do 
not have ‘hard shells’. Stating the boundaries of complex adaptive systems are no less 
problematic than in any other attempt to define systems, though with regard to international 
relations states, the international political system and the international economic system can 
be considered as complex adaptive systems.17  
Complex adaptive systems have a number of significant features. First, a central 
feature of complex adaptive systems is their propensity to develop in a non-linear fashion. To 
understand such systems therefore requires a break from a Newtonian conception of systems 
– one that has dominated systems thinking in the social sciences. Complex systems can 
behave in both linear and non-linear ways. In a linear system we would expect there to be a 
constant and predictable relationship between cause and effect. In International Relations 
theory, most models of the international system expect such a constant relationship between 
variables. In the work of Kenneth Waltz, for example, there was the expectation that there 
would be a regular relationship between the number of great powers and the characteristics of 
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international relations.18 The democratic peace theory, seen as coming ‘as close as anything 
we have to an empirical law in international relations,’19 likewise points to a supposed regular 
linear relationship in international relations – democracies don’t fight each other. In non-
linear systems there may be regularities but they are less likely to be durable. There is no 
predictable pattern in terms of the relationship between events, and there is no expectation 
that the same events will result in the same pattern of results.  
Secondly, complex systems are in a constant state of flux, and are ‘active and 
creative.’20 In other words complex systems do not remain in a ‘constant state’ where the 
interactions between the parts can be modeled, as if their features were fixed. They are 
constantly changing, and in particular, over time have a propensity to become more complex. 
Complex systems develop in an organic fashion in that the interactions between the parts, and 
the character of their interactions, become increasingly multifaceted. In this process systems 
and agents change in ways that are not reversible. Complicating matters further, in complex 
systems feedback mechanisms are seen as central to the understanding of systems 
development.  These characteristics of complex systems have considerable implications for 
the study of the social world. We have already argued that complex systems exhibit 
unpredictability. We would also argue that because of their actively creative features, it is the 
development of social systems that should be studied. There are links here with thinking 
about international relations from the perspective of Historical Sociology. Rather than seeing 
the international system, and international relations within it as essentially unchanging 
because of the determinant features of anarchy, which conditions states to act in certain ways, 
complexity theorists would argue that while international systems may be stable for a certain 




In terms of the analysis of complex systems of social relations, we are particularly 
drawn to the work of Sylvia Walby whose approach is perhaps the closest to our 
‘differentiated complexity’. We draw considerable inspiration from Walby’s analysis of 
systems, and in particular of intersectionality. Central to Walby’s discussion is the question 
of how to analyze multiple forms of social inequality. Rather than focus on one form of social 
inequality,22 Walby seeks to understand how different forms of social inequality interact, or 
intersect with each other. These intersections occur within the broader context of 
globalization. As she notes, ‘there is a need both to capture the distinctions, differentiations 
and nuances of complex inequalities…and to keep the global horizon in sight.’23 In 
complexity theory she finds the toolbox to analyze these multiple systems. Hence, a key point 
of her work is to point out how developments in complexity theory permit a re-thinking of 
the concept of system. In particular, she argues that systems, when re-conceptualized from a 
complexity perspective, do not have an inherent tendency to move towards equilibrium. 
While feedback can be negative, drawing a system towards equilibrium, it can also be 
positive, reinforcing and amplifying forces for change. Systems, while having boundaries, 
also intersect with other systems, allowing the possibility of thinking about their mutual 
influence. However these intersections are always far from straightforward (or linear), and 
forms of inequality interact in ways that can only be understood from a complexity based 
analysis. Walby’s model permits the analysis of unequal power relations between different 
systems, and her concern with intersecting forms of power reflects the concerns of feminist 
writers.24 Central to this is the concept of fitness landscape, which provides a way of 
understanding power differentials. Additionally it allows the analysis of the context in which 
actors operate, including the ability to manipulate the fitness landscape to the more powerful 
actors’ advantage.25 Walby’s approach is entirely humanocentric however and despite this 
detailed and effective account of relational and institutional complex systems, we need to 
9 
 
examine the ways in which social systems attempt to exercise domination over the non-
human world, and, at the same time, are co-constituted with and by them. 
 There are elements of International Relations theory, such as the work of Buzan and 
Little, or of historical sociologists that in focusing on historical patterns and systemic 
relations, are already open in some respects, to the use of a complexity approach. In thinking 
about complex systems, we have found it very useful to distinguish between different types. 
Here, we have drawn on the distinction between institutional, relational, and embodied social 
structure.26 We apply the same kinds of distinctions to complex systems. Drawing on a 
distinction between relational and institutional structures, for example, we can consider order 
in international systems as an emergent feature of relative distributions of power, and through 
the operation of institutions. One of the most significant features of international relations 
since 1945 has been the enormous proliferation of institutional order, in terms of 
organization, and restrictions on practice – we would argue that this is a manifestation of the 
increasing complexity of international institutional systems. 
A further insight from complexity theory which serves as an important bridge to the 
second, posthuman strand of our argument is the way in which systems are perceived as 
interactive and co-constituted. Useful here is the notion of ‘panarchy’, taken from the work of 
Gunderson and Holling and their collaborators working in resilience studies.27 This draws in 
ecosystems, political, economic and social systems, alongside a notion of local, specific 
human cultural systems. Panarchies are living systems, conceived of as internally dynamic 
and historically non-static structures which develop mutually reinforcing relationships which 
are co-constitutive and adaptive.28 There are multiple connections established by feedback 
mechanisms between both different kinds of system, and different levels of a system. It is not 
only panarchies involving human systems which demonstrate decision making properties, 
rather a huge variety of non-human animals make collective decisions and engage in 
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individual decision making behavior with a cumulate system effect.29 Living systems of 
humans, non-human animals and plants develop self-organized interactions with physical 
processes thus ‘physics sets the constraints around which life structures opportunity.’30 These 
self-organized interactions do not result in stability. Rather, systems may be vulnerable – 
ecosystems may collapse or be undermined by human endeavors, political systems may be 
vulnerable due to the collapse of natural systems on which populations depend for resources, 
or social shifts.31 Importantly also, these configurations of systems in interaction are 
themselves complex systems with their own emergent properties.32 
Eco-systems and human social systems are all complex systems in their own right.33 
Whilst social and natural systems may be shaped and structured by similar processes, 
‘signification allows human systems to divorce themselves to some degree from space and 
time, the critical organizing dimensions of ecosystems.’34 In addition, there is potentially 
increased dynamism as the reproduction of social systems means that they are more mutable. 
This does not mean that change operates towards self-regulation in terms of the maintenance 
of equilibrium. Whilst the notion of ‘panarchy’ in the work on resilience has origins in the 
study of ecology, it has moved more firmly into an examination of the detail of social system 
dynamics than most of the work in the study of ‘global ecology’. The later, whilst paying 
some attention to quality of human life questions, is overwhelming focused on human 
impacts on ‘natural’ ecological systems. As such, it tends to separate the ecological 
conditions of existence from the organisation of human social life. 35 
Rather, as the resilience perspectives  of Holling and others suggest, human systems 
may become more easily locked into paths of development that may have serious 
consequences for certain human and non-human populations. In addition, it is important to 
acknowledge the ways that human systems reproduce and develop formations of social 
power, of social relationships, which, like capitalism, patriarchy and so on, are usefully 
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understood as complex adaptive systems. Holling et al. do not adequately account for the 
systemic patterns of human inequalities and it is this which gives us an added challenge in 
using complexity in social relations. There are systems of social power relations, ecosystems 
and various levels of systems and structure in the social world that give rise to a multiplicity 
of forms of local, regional, global configurations. The central contribution that students of 
international relations can make is to study the development of that system, its self-
organising characteristics, and its relations to other human (such as capitalism, colonialism, 
patriarchy) and non-human (other species, the biosphere) systems. The embeddedness of 
systems is a key feature of differentiated complexity. International relations has always been 
about more than the mainstream script of the discipline of International Relations focused on 
relations between states. International politics has always been involved with the non-human 
and with global systemic relations of human and intra-human power. A posthuman approach 
is appropriate for the study of international relations because it enables us to think about 
politics in its embedded context with the non-human, and in terms of patterned relations of 
power. Before we outline the challenges of thinking about international politics through a 
posthumanist lens, it is necessary to specify exactly what we mean by ‘posthumanism’. 
 
Posthumanism(s) 
The term ‘posthumanism’ has entered academic and popular discourse as a descriptor for 
critical perspectives on our human centrism.36 It suggests a perspective that seeks to 
understand more about the diversity of species and non-human beings with which our world 
is constituted.37 Thus the term ‘animal’ has been seen as ridiculously broad and impossible to 
deploy with any accuracy, whilst the way species are categorized has been critiqued as more 
reflective of religious belief and political opinion, than physical or cognitive differences.38 In 
turn, the category human has always been differentiated - some humans are ‘more human’ 
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than others in the sense that the ‘animalizing’ of certain groups of humans has been 
consitutive of forms of social exclusion and oppression such as those of gender and ‘race’.39 
The social constitution of the ‘human’ has certainly impacted on non-human species and 
lifeworlds, usually regarded and utilized as means for the satisfaction of human ends. The 
term ‘posthuman’, however, is flexible, ambiguous and contested. In order to clarify our 
perspective and in this section we locate our position within a range of more and less critical 
perspectives.  
Posthumanism has been associated with transhumanism, that is, the ideology that 
emphasizes the possible good of a future in which humans are able to acquire ‘posthuman 
capacities’ and extend their life and health spans, their capacities for happiness and their 
intellectual capabilities.40 Despite the appropriation of the term posthumanism by 
transhumanist advocates, these disembodied and transcendent fantasies are best seen as ‘an 
intensification of humanism’ and hence completely distant from the project of problematising 
human centrism.41  
In sharp contrast, biophysical, philosophical and political posthumanisms centre on 
the relationships between human beings, other species and the whole other worlds of non-
human ‘nature’. A well-known example of what we might think of as biophysical 
posthumanism is the work of earth systems scientist, James Lovelock. In Lovelock’s model, 
humans are utterly embedded in, and with, the multitude of systemic processes that make up 
the ‘mega system’ of the planet. Lovelock’s fame is based on his development of the concept 
of Gaia: the idea that earth’s multifarious living forms act as regulators that control 
conditions on the planet by a series of chemical feedbacks.42 Lovelock literally sees our 
future as posthuman in the sense that he thinks that the severity of the stresses humans have 
caused in the earth’s system(s) mean that we have critically endangered the survival of 
humans and a vast number of other species.43 Fritjof Capra has linked this notion of the Earth 
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as a complex system to the politics of ecologism.44 Here, humans are part of a multitude of 
various levels of natural and social systems, in which humans exploit other species and 
scapes as resources. Human activity has had such an impact that some have argued that we 
entered a new geological era. Simon Dalby employs the term ‘anthropocene’ (originally used 
by Crutzen and Stoermer) to describe a new geological age, in which humans have remade 
the ‘circumstances of life’ of both our own existence and that of all other species, with 
serious consequences for the survival of many life forms.45 These human induced changes 
mean that the environment is increasingly artificial - we have remade the environmental 
context of our own existence. Dalby’s account is also influenced by certain kinds of political 
ecologism, and he considers our current predicament to be constituted through collective 
human activity that has been structured by carboniferous consumer capitalism, and relations 
between rich and poor regions and peoples. In such understandings, humanity is understood 
as locked into systemically exploitative relations to non-human lifeworlds, and also as 
socially intersectionalized. This kind of posthumanism is close to our notion of complex 
ecologism. 
For those writing from within animal studies, such as Ralph Acampora and Cary 
Wolfe, we need to pay attention to human animality as well, and understand not only that we 
are one (animal) life form amongst a multitude, but also that, crucially, our biology and 
evolution are co-constituted with and by this multitude.46 Writers such as Wolfe emphasize 
that it is not so much ‘the human’ that is a difficulty, but the human-centric understanding of 
the human as the unique individual striving in the world, and not embodied and embedded in 
complex biotic lifeworlds. We would very much endorse Wolfe’s understanding. 
Less politically committed than these perspectives, but perhaps more engaged with 
established notions of ‘politics’, are a range of positions within science and technology 
studies and cultural studies, which want to move beyond an outdated understanding of the 
14 
 
human in our current social, cultural and material context of technoscience. Most of these are 
very much influenced by the work of Bruno Latour who is keen to point out that we have 
never been purely human or ‘animal’.47 In the real natural/cultural world all kinds of hybrids 
are emergent. In this sense, we have never been modern, but rather we are ‘a-modern’; the 
separation of nature and culture never was. 
Widening the debate out further to include matter more generally, the political theorist 
Jane Bennett argues for a ‘vital materialism’. This animating force is a character of matter 
itself, and Bennett’s intention is to recognize the role of apparently inanimate matter affecting 
and configuring situations and events.48 Drawing on thinkers such as Spinoza, Thoreau and 
Adorno, Bennett’s argument about the animism of all things, resonates in different ways, 
with the complexity understandings of Capra and of neuroscientists Humberto Maturana and 
Francisco Varela.49 The Spinozist notion of animate matter has also been foundational for 
systems inflected political ecologism, in particular, deep ecology.50 That complex adaptive 
interactions occur between animate and inanimate matter is indicated by research on early 
human tool and brain development.51 However, in vital materialism (and indeed, in deep 
ecologsim), there is a tendency to minimize the differences between subjects and objects with 
this notion of a vitality which runs through both human and non-human matter. The end in 
view is the development of a more environmentally aware and cautious politics, but the 
elevation of the ‘shared materiality of all things’ is a rather blunt instrument in securing this 
end.52  
Following Deleuze and Guattari,53 Bennett develops the notion of assemblage in 
order, for example, to describe the multiple animate bodies of which an individual human 
body is constituted. We consider that the complexity notion of nested, overlapping or 
intersected co-evolved system(s) is more helpful. The latter allows us to differentiate and 
distinguish as well as examine the specific sites and forms of relation between the multiple 
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organisms of a human body. It also presumes a contextualising array of systemic contexts in 
which a body might emerge. A sufficiently critical posthumanism must draw in the insights 
about human centrism, human power and social justice provided by elements within political 
ecologism and critical animal studies. We may never have been human, but our analyses of 
social relations have been human exclusive. Any attempt to transform international politics in 
a posthumanist direction must have questions of political power and relations with non-
humans at its core. 
 
Posthuman Politics 
Nation states and international organizations respond to the way we have harmed non-human 
matter, by incorporating the environment, the non-human lifeworld, into existing modes of 
the political – securitization and governance. This has been reflected in the discipline of 
International Relations by the development of environmental security and environmental 
governance as specific subfields. We have suggested elsewhere, that these approaches retain 
a traditional state-centred perspective in which ‘the environment’ is seens as threatened by, or 
a threat to, human beings. 54A posthumanist perspective however, does not understand the 
environment as ‘out there’ but rather as ‘with’ and ‘in here’. A key difficulty is that the 
spatial boundaries of the nation state deal poorly with non-human relations and our 
entanglements with other beings and things. Thom Kuehls has argued that such 
entanglements with biological life and non-human lifeworlds produce a topology that cannot 
be contained or understood within the current frameworks of nation states and international 
system.55 For Isabelle Stengers such political institutions are deeply problematic – we cannot 
reduce the inclusion of non-human worlds in politics to an account of the role they would 
play in political association and public life as currently constituted.56 This is because the very 
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framing of those institutions was developed by mobilizing the category ‘human’ – our idea of 
what constitutes politics is human exceptionalist and exclusionist.  
Allowing space in political life and political analysis for non-human beings and things 
however, would be radically trangressive for the tightly circumscribed discipline of politics 
and its smaller sibling, International Relations. There is a profusion of complex materials, 
systems and processes through and with which we humans live. We consider that a 
posthuman approach to politics involves the recasting of key debates around the subjects, 
actors and objects of politics, political representation, and possibilities for policy change.  
The history of political theory has ascribed political will and agency to humans alone 
(or often, to very limited groups of humans). Even those contemporary thinkers with 
challenging and radical notions of the nature of decision making in democratic political 
institutions, consider that (human) speech is the medium of politics.57  Those political 
theorists with environmental credentials have also cast both technologies and ‘natures’ as 
outside of political life – as the objects of political attention rather than political agents with 
affect and causality.58 Those experimenting with radical notions of ‘environmental 
democracy’ have only experimented so far, and tend to conceive of politics as a human-
exclusive sphere of activity and democratic decision-making that is separate from the objects 
over which democratic deliberation takes place.59  
Bennett contests this humanocentrism with her notion of ‘thing power.’60 This enables 
us to see agentic capacity as distributed, and as distributed differently ‘across a range of 
ontological types.’61 In describing an electric grid as an assemblage of vital material and in 
her use of the term emergent properties, Bennett is actually close to the notion of a complex 
system.62 Such systems, or for Bennett, non-human assemblages, can act. However, what she 
actually means is something else - assemblages can have an impact or effect on humans and 
non-humans. Following on from this, she argues that human agency has never been separate 
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from the non-human world, but always intermingled and co-constituted. Herein lays a 
recurrent problem in Bennett’s work – a conflation between the idea of the properties and 
powers of beings and things, the notion of action and the idea of agency.  
Margaret Archer argues that a defining characteristic of agency, as opposed to action, 
is that it is plural – agents are collectivities and actors are singular.63 Individual actors might 
reflect on their embodied situation and they might also recognize commonality. Individual 
actors may also possess will and intent. In animal studies, there have been suggestions that 
many non-human animals have agency because they have ‘the capacity for self-willed 
action’.64 However, following Archer, Bob Carter and Nickie Charles consider that many 
non-human animals can be seen as agents to the degree that they share life chances and are 
affected by their social location.65 Considering this social location is of prime importance, for 
non-human animals are ‘highly disadvantaged’ in an anthropocentric distribution of 
resources.66 For Archer, to engage in anything beyond this primary agency, another emergent 
property is needed – political influence, associated with, for example, social movements. 
Carter and Charles further argue that language enables humans to change the world and their 
own place in it to such a degree that there is a fundamental asymmetry in the agency of 
human and non-human animals.67 We are not convinced that there is sufficient understanding 
of forms of communication in other species to preclude animal agency, but concur with 
Carter and Charles that whilst many non-human animals might be agentic beings, they cannot 
usually exercise agency.68 Rather, where they exert political influence, this is via human 
representation in the form of social movement organizations or NGOs. This is fundamentally 
shaped by context – that of human domination over non-human animals. 
The retort of those such as Bennett, Latour and Haraway, might be that unless we 
allow for the agency of things, and unless we decentre human language as an enabler of 
agency, we cannot decentre the human in political analysis. Bennett has rightly argued that 
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the human/non-human dichotomy in political thought has not helped many of the political 
demands of humanism - the successful articulation of human rights claims, for example.69 
Conversely however, there are serious questions to be raised about Bennett’s assumption that 
a distributing concept of agency will be effective in unsettling humanocentric politics.70 
Latour has argued that the powers and properties of non-human ‘objects’ call for a public 
space that is profoundly different from what is usually recognized as ‘the political.’71 In his 
view, a more fully democratic space recognizes that our collective public is not a body of 
human representatives of human interests, but a cosmos. 
 Latour wants to redefine the notion of the public and the idea of a political assembly. 
Whilst humans are held to be able to articulate views about the world, interests and ‘wants’, 
non-humans cannot and are thus held not to have interests, opinions and ‘wants’. For Latour, 
the natural, technical world of non-human beings and things is represented, not by politicians 
but by professional experts, by ‘science’. Science represents not the ‘wants’ of beings and 
things however, but ‘facts’ about them. Politicians, on the other hand, also represent, but are 
seen to represent views; claims and desires.72 For Isabelle Stengers this raises the problem of 
authority – there is power in both these kinds of representation, the representation of human 
wills and the representation of ‘facts’ about non-human worlds.73 Undergirding these ideas is 
the notion that political representation is an artifice. As Latour claims, it is a 
misrepresentation to say that ‘the people’ speak for themselves – they elect others who claim 
to speak in their name.74 What both Stengers and Latour propose is the idea of being the 
representatives of ‘things’ in the same assembly as the parliaments which claim to represent 
the wills of the ‘people’ -  they want closer integration between scientific expertise and 
politics. We endorse the critique of the artifice of representation, although we consider that 
Latour’s conception of representing non-humans is horizontal - there are incredible 
differences in properties, powers, affects, interests and even standpoints that fundamentally 
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affect the politics of representing the ‘non-human’ in all its enormity. In addition, the 
representation of non-humans by scientists is not free from humanism, nor is it necessarily an 
extension of democracy as Latour suggests it would be. 
James Brassett and William Smith have argued that the difficulties of deliberation are 
further exacerbated at the level of international politics.75 Whilst there have been many 
argument for the democratization of global governance and the increase of deliberation 
involving ‘global civil society’, opening up international organizations to such deliberation is 
contested and difficult.76 This is particularly so because of the way in which international 
political institutions and processes reflect systemic imperatives of relational power, such as 
that of capital.77 In opening up the international political arena to deliberation, it is interesting 
to see those similar problems of engagements through representation by elites (comparable to 
the professional scientists of Latour and Stengers) surfacing. For example, Brassett and Smith 
emphasize cultural interventions by NGOs.78 
Environmental questions are subsumed under a bureaucratic rationality of resource 
managerialism by various nodes in the institutional system of international politics, be they 
local, national, regional or ‘global’ levels of governance.79 As Eva Lövbrand and Johannes 
Stripple note for example, the climate itself has become understood as an international 
political space, which is fundamentally shaped by local, national and international politics.80 
The contemporary features of the ‘carbon-cycle’ are tied in to a logic of nation states 
operating territorially. The climate is also a space shaped by relational power - of capitalism, 
coloniality and other regimes of power and domination which are minimally disrupted by the 
elite political or scientific ‘representation’ of the interests of non-human beings and systems.  
At present, it is difficult to see how we can get around the question of the problematic 
representation of non-human interests in politics, or whether in fact, ‘representation’ is a 
concept that can be utilized to this end. This said, we are not sure that the embedding of 
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representation of the non-human by scientific elites, into political institutions will result in 
significant change. Such elite representation is already part of the national and international 
processes of making policies ‘about’ the ‘environment’. However we would argue that an 
understanding of the world in terms of complex systems may enable less problematic policies 
to be made. We are seeing some changes, albeit limited ones, with patterns of decision-
making becoming more participatory, involving a greater range of actors in particular NGOs, 
and a larger range of concerns (such as the ‘environment’, human rights, and animal rights). 
Policy makers at all levels in the institutional system are confronted with the complexity of 
socio-ecological issues, and a larger range of potential issues and side effects. Sandra 
Mitchell suggests a two-pronged approach to dealing with decision making in a complex 
world. She suggests that prediction should be replaced with models ‘of multiple alternative 
futures’ which evaluate different variables and possible policy effects.81 Others suggest that it 
is possible to go further, and to use the dynamics of complex systems in productive ways.82  
From this brief discussion perhaps two general ideas could be derived. First, a 
precautionary principle. The study of complexity suggests that the possibilities for predicting 
the outcomes of certain policies are limited. This does not mean that all policies are doomed 
to failure, or that policy should not be made or implemented. However, ‘we are not only 
failing to solve the persistent problems we face, but are in fact causing them.’83 Policies, may 
have expected outcomes, however in complex systems, the unexpected should be anticipated, 
and hence the possible wider implications of policy options should be considered carefully 
before implementation. Morin argues that policy makers need a strategy, which he defines as 
‘the art of working with uncertainty.’84 Second, a humility principle. Complexity approaches 
stress the character of over-lapping and inter-sectionalized systems. Human systems are 
embedded and co-exist with uncountable animate and inanimate systems. Developments and 
processes within one system can ripple through systems sparking different development 
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trajectories. As Morin points out ‘action escapes the will of the actor’, entering not only 
wider human society, but also potentially into non-human systems.85  
Policy makers need to avoid the ‘arrogant dogmatism which rules non-complex forms 
of thinking”, and accept the human situation of being embedded within a potentially 
enormous range of other systems.86 The latter, we would suggest, is difficult to envisage 
within the normative frameworks of politics where ‘environmental’ questions become 
matters of governance and securitization, and are conceptualized as threats to human 
populations. Here, we humans are often cast as at the mercy of non-human forces that must 
be regulated and controlled. This understanding of the human as separate from all other 
species and natural systems is fundamentally problematic for in complexity, ecosystems are 
complex systems and fundamentally affected by and co-constituted with, natural systems. In 
addition, however, re-envisioning the political to incorporate the representation of the ‘facts’, 
let alone the ‘wants’ of non-human beings and things is almost impossible to envisage in 
political institutions, at all levels, as currently constituted. Whilst we are co-constituted by 
and with the non-human, the implications of this for political organization are uncertain, but 
likely to necessitate radical change.87 There is not space in this article for suggesting what 
changes to current practices might be useful and possible. We do however want to suggest 
that changes must be significant. Whilst the posthuman politics of Latour and others provides 
a normative compunction to consider the non-human as bound up with the human condition 
of life, this critical ontology is more firmly established when integrated with insights from 
political ecologism, because this undertakes a thorough critique of the impact and power of 





In the first two sections of this article, we made the argument that complex systems are 
ecologically embedded – we are caught up with multiplicities of species and things. We also 
considered that complex systems could be of different kinds - institutional, embodied and 
relational. Inter-human relations have been shaped by histories of distinction and domination, 
and at the same time have co-evolved with non-human systems. A complex and posthuman 
orientation to politics also requires an analysis of human centrism and human domination. 
The different schools of political ecologism have much to offer here, but they need re-
working through the lens of complexity.  Whilst complexity theory provides us with an 
overarching framework (of multiple, interrelated, co-constituted complex systems) it does not 
imply a normative position. Niklas Lumann is right to suggest that it is a ‘meta-theory’.88 
Different political ecologisms have used the notion of ‘system’ to think about human 
relations with non-human systems, and have usefuly deployed ideas of domination and 
exploitation in so doing. In complexity models, all systems are bound up with others, and we 
suggest here that systems of social relations between both humans and other species and 
between different groups of humans are also usefully seen as complex systems. 
Deep ecologism already adopts a systemic approach to understanding the organization 
and patterning of both social and natural life – it uses complexity as a framework for 
understanding relations between human and non-human systems. All processes are connected 
and human intervention in natural ecosystems cannot be without impact. Arne Naess suggests 
that living beings of all kinds are ‘knots’ in a biospherical field of relations.89 Such webs of 
relationships are incredibly complex and need to be understood as vast systems that interlock 
us with a variety of species and scapes. The net of relations is of paramount importance, and 
no ‘system’ is discrete, as Robyn Eckersley puts it: 
23 
 
The world is an intrinsically dynamic, interconnected web of relations in 
which there are no absolute discrete entities and no absolute dividing lines 
between the living and the non-living, the animate and the inanimate, or the 
human and the non-human.90  
It is unsurprising then, that deep ecologism and  complexity theory have already been drawn 
together.91 In addition, a strength of deep ecologism is that it understands human society as 
structured in particular relations with the ‘natural world’, a system of relationships termed 
‘anthropocentrism’. Western society is human-centred in its organization and has a dominant 
worldview in which non-human natures are conceptualized in terms of means to human ends. 
However, anthropocentrism has been used in ways that marginalize human diversity and are 
blind to social inequalities.92 It has not been understood as a complex social system. Whilst 
we want to retain this notion of social relations with ‘the environment’ as systemic and 
exploitative, we also understand human relations with the environment as socially 
intersectionalized, that is, existent in a context of overlapping relations with other systems of 
social relations, such as those based on class, gender, and ethnic hierarchy.  
A key insight of complexity approaches is the notion of self-organization – that order 
can arise without a specific orderer. Here there is a considerable overlap with anarchist 
contributions to the study of political ecology. In the work of Bookchin in particular, the 
analysis of various kinds of social hierarchies and forms of institutionalized social 
domination is key, and Bookchin’s understanding of these as co-constitutive is highly 
compatible with a complexity understanding of social systems. Bookchin’s contribution in 
turn, was highly influenced by the work of Peter Kropotkin. Both Bookchin and Kropotkin 
are significant for contemporary debates. This is, at least in part, because they consider the 
relationship between natural systems and social forms, and, in our view, they develop 
understandings of the world that are compatible with complexity approaches. In Bookchin’s 
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case, complexity is specifically referenced and critiqued;93 interestingly however, it is 
Kropotkin who might be read as more clearly a proto-complexity theorist.  
Mutual Aid stressed the process of evolution as one where successful adaptation and 
exploitation of evolutionary niches is secured by species’ propensity for co-operation and 
solidarity.94 This is very similar to ‘symbiogenesis’, a notion used extensively in complexity 
biology.95 Many of Kropotkin’s ideas are elaborated in the work of Bookchin, who has been 
instrumental in linking anarchism to green social and political thought. The notion of 
overlapping and intersected forms of social domination which are systemic and co-
constituting is clearly compatible with a complex systems analysis of social domination. In 
addition, Bookchin’s understanding of the hybridized and amorphous nature of contemporary 
political systems embedded firmly in the social fabric and constantly in the processes of 
arranging and rearranging social life – maintaining themselves – can be given a complexity 
reading.96 
Patterns of hierarchy and domination usurp, distort and reconfigure human relations, 
but also, particularly for Bookchin, structure our co-existence with non-human natures. 
Complexity theory, with its notions of co-existing, interrelated, multi-leveled and co-
constituted systems enables the capture of the ontological depth of relational systems of 
social domination (of class, race, ethnicity, gender and so on) and their interaction or 
intersection. Here, socialist and feminist ecologisms have made important contributions. 
Peter Dickens suggests for example, that the nexus of environmental exploitation is the social 
organization of labour power in capitalist societies around the production of goods for the 
market.97 Indigenous and post-colonial ecologisms have stressed the ways in which ethnic 
hierarchy and exclusions and notions of race impact on the geography of environmental 
‘problems’ and the vulnerabilities of certain populations.98 Further, a complexity reading of 
Marx has been developed by David Harvey in suggesting that local actions (for example, the 
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exploitation of workers) reproduce the capitalist system and its emergent properties (for 
example, class relations, resource depletion) and give rise to various system contradictions 
(from social movements to environmental collapse).99 For various theorists, contemporary 
developments in capitalist relations means ‘nature’ becomes increasingly internal to the 
dynamics of capital accumulation as biotechnology is harnessed to overcome ‘natural’ 
barriers .100 Thus Harvey suggests that we now have what he calls ‘constructed 
ecosystems.’101  
Unfortunately, some writers in these fields are strongly antagonistic to feminist 
political ecologisms which are considered forms of reverse sexism, or positions which 
essentialize gender differences.102 Ecofeminism provides an analysis of the domination of 
nature as interrelated particularly with gender, but in many cases, also with a range of other 
forms of systemic inequalities.103 Ariel Salleh has emphasized that a rounded, ‘triangulated’ 
political ecologism would integrate the analysis of gender relations, north-south relations and 
those of capital, into an understanding of human relations with ‘nature’.104 We see some of 
these feminist approaches as fully intersectionalized forms of social ecologism and 
compatible with a complexity analysis of multiple, co-evolved and dynamic systems of social 
relations. Ecofeminist analysis has tended to emphasize the systemic properties and effects of 
patriarchy, but would be enhanced by understanding systems of social relations of power, or 
social domination (such as patriarchy, capitalism, and the domination of the natural world) as 
analytically distinct but overlapping. It would also be strengthened by deployed complexity 
concepts in articulating how these relational systems are co-constituted with other systems of 
non-human beings and things.105  
We take from deep ecologism that there is a social system of human domination, but 
consider that this takes historically and geographically specific formations. Such domination 
is linked to multiplicitious intra-human formations of domination, outlined in various ways 
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by the different kinds of social ecologism. We conceive these systems as both analytically 
distinct, whilst being also, mutually constitutive. The domination of non-human nature is a 
system of exploitative relations that overlaps and interlinks with other systems of power and 
domination based on gender, capital, ethnic hierarchy and so on. This is what we call 
‘complex ecologism’. The politics of complex ecologism requires the interrogation and 
undermining of contemporary forms of social relations, both within and across species. It also 
requires that we understand international politics very differently. 
 
Conclusion:  Posthuman International Relations 
What draws together different kinds of posthumanisms is the idea of the politics of ‘life’ – be 
it human or non-human. ‘We,’ the living,106 for example, are embedded in a carbon cycle that 
international politics seeks increasingly to regulate. Our embodied and embedded condition 
in a world of multiple species and systems which operate at multiple levels from domestic 
relations in the home to the regulation of the temperature of the planet, raise deep problems 
for politics based on the fictive constructs of nation states. Yet in the contemporary world, 
nation states are multiplying and many are strengthening. Even in the face of anthropogenic 
climate change, the politics of states assert themselves in regional and global policy for as 
Lövbrand and Stripple note:  
…the 1997 Kyoto Protocol to the Climate convention opens up the inclusion 
of land-based carbon sinks as a way for states to comply with their emission 
reduction targets. In less than fifteen years, the international climate discourse 
has rearticulated global carbon flows as “national sinks”.107  
Vital materialists such as Stengers argue that we cannot have a politics that is not 
attached to a cosmos – we need to articulate a ‘cosmopolitics’ to reflect our more-than-
human condition.108 The complexity theorizing of Edgar Morin suggests a similarly 
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cosmological understanding of the co-constituted lifeworld of social and natural systems.109 
We would not disagree, but we do think these are utopian texts. 
The world of politics, national and international, is an artifice, just at Latour suggests. 
It cannot capture the cosmological reality of life on this planet and attempts by institutions of 
human governance to regulate life, since the eighteenth century in particular, have remade a 
world in deeply problematic ways. Thom Keuhls has argued that the space of ecopolitics 
must be beyond sovereign territory.110 Currently, it is not, and we are faced with the 
biopolitics of nation states and the international institutional system of states attempting to 
regulate life with such problematic consequences. The notion of bio-regionalism, developed 
in the 1970s, remains a pipedream; notions of ‘environmental citizenship’ poorly describe the 
identities of human citizens and the speaking, human political subject remains a foundational 
discourse of ‘the political’.  
International Relations has not been particularly imaginative when attempting to 
broaden its repertoire to include ‘the environment’ and thus has an additive approach to the 
non-human lifeworld. ‘Environmental issues’ are understood as problems which might be 
attended to within the existing frameworks of securisation and governance. Perhaps if 
International Relations - a discipline so pre-occupied with territory and borders - can move 
more firmly into explaining international politics in terms of systems, preferably complex 
ones, and not just institutional ones, it might better grasp the politics of the world in which 
we live. That world, as complexity theory suggests, is not divided into territories in which 
bounded societies of humans live under singular political authority and in the context of 
discrete ‘natural environments’. The politics of posthumanism urges us to attend to the 
realities of our situation in a world where we are all made up of multiple species and things. 
International Relations has demonstrated, at least at its margins, the growth of critical 
positions on its state-centrism. This has been particularly driven by feminist scholarship and 
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the attempt to broaden the actors and ‘populations’ of study – to women of course, and also 
more recently, to children. The realization of an International Relations which better 
appreciates the ways in which our world is teeming with multiple human and non-human 
lives, relations and formations of being, represents a more fundamental challenge.  
A complexity approach to international politics that takes into account the worlds 
beyond the human species, requires an understanding of social, political and economic 
relations as impacting beyond the human and as co-constituted by elements of non-human 
and human systems. In considering systems of social relations as complex and 
intersectionsised, we are not forced into the ‘either/or’ dichotomy that has driven deep 
ecologists into dispute with other forms of political ecologism. As relational systems are co-
constituted, we need to account for both human domination of non-human lifeworlds and 
intra-human inequalities. In complex ecologism, these cannot be separated out. Thus we 
argued for a political position of complex ecologism, which attempts to account for social 
intersectionality and various kinds of power relations. This article has asserted the need for 
rethinking the boundaries of ‘the political’ in the light of our posthuman being in the world; 
our condition as co constituted with myriad other beings and things. We have used 
complexity theory in order to develop a critical ontology – complex ecologism - that can 
examine social formations of power in relation to intra-human social differences and patterns 
of human domination over non-human systems. In addition, it understands human relations 
and social institutions as embodied and co-constituted within systems involving a multiplicity 
of beings and things. Posthumanism and complex ecologism demand a different way of 
seeing what international relations might be. Whilst we have many disagreements with 
Latour, we endorse his understanding of the social world as ever implicated with non-
humans. If International Relations wants to be relevant to understanding the complexity of 
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